24 February 1975

STATINTL   MEMORANDUM FOR: [   ]

SUBJECT   : Comments on Murphy Commission Draft Report

Introduction - no comments.

Section I, p. 8, last two lines of second para. - better words would be:

". . . and as such is responsible for coordinating all foreign

intelligence activities of the U. S. Government."

Section I, p. 10, lines 8 & 9 under DIA:

Director DIA is no longer program manager for GDIP and SRV.

ASD(I) now has these responsibilities.

Section I, p. 11 - Under NSA. Second para. is incorrect. The Service

Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) are under the operational and

technical control of Director, NSA. The SCA Chiefs also

perform certain cryptologic related functions for their parent

Services, for which they receive direction from the Service

Chief. Some of these Service peculiar functions do involve

maintenance of field units for direct support to military forces.

The relationship between NSA and the SCAs is not ambiguous.

Section I, p. 11 - NRO - I believe it is incorrect to describe NRO as a

part of "Air Force intelligence." It is not a part, either

organizationally or in management and direction.

<u>Section I, p. 12</u> - Many possible errors in fact or interpretation

under Service Intelligence para.

-- I question the source, validity and meaning of the large

manpower figures given for Army, Navy, and Air Force intelli-

gence.

-- At least in the case of the Navy, it is totally incorrect to

say that, [   ] . . . "   STATINTL

-- Given the inaccuracy of these figures, it is wrong to say,

in the second sentence, that "the three major Service agencies

are all (SIC -- each) larger than DIA. [   ]   STATINTL

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-- It is also incorrect, as noted previously, to include NRO

as a part of Air Force intelligence.

(Check accuracy of USIB Committee Chart)

<u>Section II, p. 1, line 5</u> - change DCI to CIA.

<u>Section III, p. 5, 2nd para.</u> I understand the designation of the DCI

as vice Chairman of NSCIC has never been made official. Letter

drafted but never signed.

<u>Section III, p. 6, first line</u> - strike out "director"

<u>Section IV, p. 1, first para., last line</u> - IRAC is "Resources" not

"requirements"

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Section V, p. 1, first para - This paragraph conveys a very wrong

impression regarding the contribution of NSA, DIA and NRO

(see last sentence) when one reads the second line, "Most of

their effort is limited to 'tactical' . . . ." Perhaps use of

word "much" in place of "most" would be easiest fix.

Section V, p. 2, lines 5-6 and 9-10 convey a misinterpretation.

"Tactical" or military force support intelligence elements are

organic to forces as a part of the force enabling the Commander

to execute his mission. They are not "nice to have" or "more

comfortable" to the Commander as their reason for being, as

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this paragraph portrays.

The second para. is a non sequitur.

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and does not include "tactical"

resources, which may be as much as double.

Section V, p. 3 - "Tactical" figures are available, as are all DOD

budget items. All one needs to find "tactical" intelligence

resource figures is a definition of what to include.

Section V, p. 5, NSA para., lines 4-6: I agree that military coverage

dominates the SIGINT business, but I will not agree that this is

"at the expense of other national needs" -- a connotation that

other needs are not being met because of military dominance.

Not True.

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Section V, NSA para., last sentence, again connotes that non-military

needs are not being met because of military dominance. This

is not true and is the fault of DCI and USIB if it should be true.

Section V, second para., lines 3-5. Comments on further career

aspirations hampering objectivity of DIRNSA is factually wrong.

Only one DIRNSA has ever been advanced in his Service, and only

one other has been advanced outside his Service. All other

retired, and one reverted to two-star status.

Section V, p. 7, lines 2-4. The only position in NSA traditionally held

by a military officer is the Director. All other senior positions

do rotate and all have rotated among civilians and military.

Section V, p. 7, second para., line 3 -- word "cryptographic" should

be "cryptologic. "

Section V, last para. on p. 7 and first para. on p. 8 are grossly mis-

leading in impressions of relationships between NSA and SCAs

plus role of Service Chiefs. This was explained in great detail

to Mr. Wm. Harris.

Section V, p. 8, 2nd para. regarding CSS. The CSS is an abortion and

was deliberately engineered to be so by ASD(I) and a former

Director of NSA.

Section V, p. 13 - Remedies recommended to improve the Defense

Attache System are of little value. Promotion should not be

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treated as a reward for one tour of duty, as suggested. The

real remedy for DAS problems is to improve the prestige and

image of the Military Attache, and restore personnel reductions

which have cut the system by more than half.

Section VI, p. 6, full para. at mid page:

Discussion equates HUMINT to clandestine HUMINT, which is

wrong. Result is wrong conclusion and bad recommendation.

Section VII - no comments.

Section VIII - no comments.

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